THE ATTITUDE OF LOWER COURTS TO CHANGING PRECEDENTS by unknown
THE ATTITUDE OF LOWER COURTS TO CHANGING
PRECEDENTS
IN a legal system which places a premium on consistency, precedent
presents itself as the backbone of the judicial process. Adherence to prece-
dent is the rule and not the exception.' The substance of this rule is two-
fold although the dichotomy is not clearly delineated. By stare decisis a
court is bound to follow its own previous decisions. And by the very nature
of the judicial system, "lower" courts are bound to follow previous rulings
of that appellate tribunal which may ultimately approve or reject lower court
decisions. These doctrines blend, however, so that when the temper of the
appellate court demonstrates- a willingness to re-examine established prece-
dents on the purely pragmatic basis of current needs, 2 and stare derisis
becomes "a useful rule but not an inexorable command," 3 the problem as
to choice of, and conformance to, precedents presented to the "inferior"
tribunals becomes significant.
Currently, this inquiry is posed before the courts of the United States
as a consequence of the patent "revolution" within the nation's highest
behch. 4 The Court has adopted a "practical" view of stare decisis, putting
that doctrine not in the forefront of, but among, the paraphernalia of
decision. The Supreme Court long ago declared that, especially in the field
of constitutional law, it was more important for it to be tardily correct than
consistent.5 Historical dissents have become law. 6 The development of the
country accompanied by its ever changing circumstances, the continuous
changes among the Court's personnel, and the constant adjustment and modi-
fication in what is essentially a trial and error technique have all played
havoc with the postulates of the Blackstonians. 7
"Inferior" judges are obviously mindful of these changes, but their opinions
do not consistently evince their awareness. They seem to feel automatically
constricted by Supreme Court utterances. Though "some of the decisions
were by a divided court, it is not for us to question the correctness of the
1. CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 34, 149.
2. Davis, Revolution in the Supreme Court (1940) 166 AT. MONTHLY 85, 92;
Ballantine, Business Without Precedents (1940) 166 ATL. MONTIHLY 235.
3. Mr. Justice Reed, concurring in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 92
(1938). See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932).
4. Hamilton & Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 1318. Hamilton & Braden, The Supreme Court Today (1940) 103 Naw
REPUBLIC 178; Davis, loc. cit. supra note 2.
5. See Barden v. Northern P. R. R., 154 U. S. 288, 322 (1894); The Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 283, 470 (U. S. 1849).
6. Most recent example of a dissent expressly becoming a majority opinion is
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 397 (1940).
7. Willis, Some Coflicting Decisions of the United States Supreme Court (1927)
13 VA. L. REv. 155, 278; Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication (1933)
46 HARv. L. REV. 361, 593, 795.
PRECEDENT AND THE LOVER COURTS
rules enunciated" s and "though its soundness has been questioned (it) still
stands as a flat-footed declaration" 9 inasmuch as "the choice is not one for
an 'inferior' court"'-0 and "ordinarily a lone district judge has nothing to do but
obey." ' - Rarely have members of the junior bench dared to defy a Supreme
Court decision considered, in good faith, to be doomed or erroneous.' 2
Though occasionally affirmed in this disobedience, the great majority of
district, circuit, and state judges, even though confronted with a possibility
of over-ruling and vigorous criticism by the higher court 13 usually do not
take the full stride.
Theoretically, perhaps, precedents established by the highest court are
conclusive on lower courts and leave to the latter no scope for independent
judgment or discretion.14 Actually, however, lower courts have not accepted
precedents as binding in the "strictest sense." Only a leading case, one
established through popular usage, repeated judicial affirmation, and general
recognition by approved writers o'n legal topics, commands the full respect
of lower judges.' Other cases have been weakened as precedent because
they were the product of a strongly-divided bench, because of the absence
or non-participation of some justices, because of hesitancy and doubt in
the written opinion, or because of affirmation by an equally-divided Court.10
Even more precedents have been rejected through the stratagem of dis-
tinguishment; others have been the subject of conscious judicial oversight.
As a consequence, judicial discretion among "inferior" judges is not so
confined and limited as legal theorists would have it. Yet it is by no means
so extensive and broad as current decisions demand. It is this discretion
which currently needs extension, encouragement, and direction.
8. Bullard v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 90 F. (2d) 144, 150 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
9. Ostrom v. Edison, 244 Fed. 228, 236 (D. N. J. 1917).
10. Rothensies v. Cassell, 103 F. (2d) 834, 837 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
11. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 218 Fed. 91, 93
(E. D. Ky. 1914). The most recent e-xample is Gold .,. United States, 115 F. (2d) 236
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
12. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Western Union Te!egraph Co., 218 Fed. 91, 110
(E. D. Ky. 1914), app. di.mn'd, 242 U. S. 665 (1917j, wherein Cochran, J. refused to
follow Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449 (1906) because "it is thoroughly wrong on its
merits"' Accord: James v. Amarillo City Light & Water Co., 251 Fed. 337, 345
(N. D. Tex. 1918); Sanders v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 261 Fed. 697, 703
(N. D. Ga. 1919); Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. Raines, 238 S. W . 904 (Tex.
Comm. App. 19-2); Northern Wisconsin Co-op Pool %. Bekkedal, 12 Wis. 571, 593,
197 N. W. 936, 944 (1924); Ex parte Tigner, 132 S. W. (2d) 85, 893 (T. Cr.
App. 1939); and see Investors' Syndicate v. Porter, 52 F. (2d) 1S9, 196 (D. Mont.
1931) (dissenting opinion).
13. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 303 U. S. 79 (1939); United States v. Sprague,
282 U. S. 716, 730 (1931) ("the appellees do not attempt to justify the lower court's
action by the reasons it states . . .").
14. BLAcK, LAw oF JuDIcIAL PRECEDENTS (1912) 10.
15. BAI.wlx, THE AarAic. , JumcxuRYi (1914) 59.
16. BLACr, op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 21, 35, 43.
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Such discretion can best be broadened by a readjustment of the attitude
of lower courts toward superior tribunals. Traditionally, lower courts have
looked to the past, to what the upper court has done. Yet the Supreme
Court's current movement necessitates an "inferior" counterpart which can
be realized only through a progressive view by judges whose opinions should
look beyond what occurred yesterday to what ought to prevail today or,
at least, to what will prevail tomorrow.
In order for "inferior" judges to provide the prophylactic influence required
by the uncertainty which characterizes current decisions, they must realize
their own power and assert a more unrestrained rule of precedent.
Lower court judges should not be thought to exist in a judicial world
apart from the mundane universe. As members of the bench, they are no
different from justices of the Supreme Court. Their judicial problem is
intrinsically identical. As members of society, they are constituents of the
community, subject to prevailing mores, aware of election returns. Like
businessmen they are cognizant of the country's economic strains and
stresses, and they are subject to practically the same social pressure as the
man in the street. And as members of a trade they have sufficient knowledge
of their fellow workers to forecast their movements and to understand each
judicial action. So equipped and so situated one might well question whether
an inferior court fulfills the requirements of its function by mechanically
following decisions known to be contrary to the philosophy of the bench,
the needs of society, and the personal prejudices of a controlling majority
of the Supreme Court.
Perhaps "inferior" judges should adopt an attitude in selecting precedents
somewhat like the critically inquiring approach of most courts to questions
of fact. Or more precisely, they might follow the practical, pragmatic view
of the incumbent Supreme Court toward stare decisis.
Thus, cases whose foundations have been seriously shaken, even though
they remain technically "good law," should not command the respect of
the lower courts. A good illustration of the problem is presented by the
history of the rule of Tyson & Brother v. Banton1 7 and Ribnik v. McBride,18
only recently reversed on its face by the Supreme Court. Justice Sutherland,
who wrote for the Court in both instances, in deciding that the Ribnik case
necessarily followed from the Tyson case, seemingly concluded that price
regulation in regard to all brokers was prohibited because their business was
not "affected with a public interest." Justice Brandeis, however, who dis-
sented in both these cases, spoke for a unanimous court in Tagg Brothers
& Moorehead v. United States'9 two years later and detracted from the
17. 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
18. 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
19. 280 U. S. 420 (1930).
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universal applicability of the Ribnik decision by sustaining Congressional
control over stockyard brokers operating in interstate commerce.
A New York statute again appeared before the Court in Nebbia v. N&-w
York2 In upholding as constitutional an act establishing the store price
for a quart bottle of milk, the Court, this time with Justice Roberts deliver-
ing the opinion, adopted Justice Holmes' dissent in the Tyson case21 and
effectively interred the previously-defined doctrine of affectation with a
public interest. "The phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason,
is subject to control for the public good."2 2 The Tyson and Rilmih cases
were not specifically upset but they were placed upon a new footing -
"upon the basis that the requirements of due process were not met because
the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and effect.' '2
With their original foundations removed, the Tyson and Rilmih cases
remained technically good law. But undoubtedly they persisted only as
precarious precedent in the light of the new test of an act's reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose. Yet no district or circuit court
pronounced them dead. Forced to follow the Nebbia decision, they cited it
only to append the inevitable "See Tyson v. Banton" or "See Ribnik v.
McBride."'2 4 One district judge even applied them when dealing with the
New Jersey cleaning and dyeing trade2 while another approved them in a
dictum. 26
Only one tribunal, the New York Supreme Court, openly admitted that
"the Supreme Court adopted a new ruling . . . and that ruling, being in
effect a reversal of its earlier decisions, is both controlling and compelling
on this court."2 7 Interestingly enough, judge Bernstein, who wrote the
opinion, was at the time confronted with a re-enactment of the statute struck
down in the Tyson case. The Ribnik fact situation recently re-appeared
in the Nebraska Supreme Court.2 8 That court, though counsel ably depicted
the demise of the 1928 decision, felt bound thereby, for "The Supreme Court
20. 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
21. ". . . The notion that a business" is clothed with a public interest and has
been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what
is disagreeable to the sufferers. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to com-
pensation when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business
when 'it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it." Tyson & Brother v. Banton,
273 U. S. 418, 446 (1927).
22. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 536 (1934).
23. Ibid.
24. See, for example, Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. S90, 896 (D.
N. D. 1938); Yankee Network v. F. C. C., 107 F. (2d) 212, 221 (App. D. C. 1939).
25. Kent Stores of N. J. v. Wilentz, 14 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D. N. J. 1936).
26. United States v. Seven Oaks Dairy Co., 10 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (D. Mass. 1935).
27. Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. 'Moss, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 491 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
28. State v. Kinney, 293 N. W. 393 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1940), 27 V . L. Rry. 115, 29
GEo. L: J. 110.
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has not expressly overruled the case of Ribuik v. McBride. .-. . We can-
not logically indulge in speculation." '2 9 But counsel's contention was proved
to be more than "mere speculation" when the Supreme Court, reversing
the timid lower court, held Ribnik v. McBride not to be the law of the
land.3 0
Similar to precedents like the Tyson and Ribnik cases, which hang in
the air, with the ground cut from under, is an ancient, unoverruled decision,
ravished by the passage of time and existing in a strange new environment.
For an "inferior" judge to grant credence to such a precedent would be
to exalt the past for its own sake. Such a decision is Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co.,"' a case in which the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was used to overthrow an early Illinois Anti-Trust
Act. The act had exempted from its provisions farmers and cattle raisers
and Justice Harlan could not find "under what rule of permissible classi-
fication"3 2 such legislation could be sustained. Within four years this case
was placed in doubt by Cox v. Texas, 3 upholding a Texas liquor statute
although it expressly did not apply to wines produced from grapes while
in the hands of agriculturists. Nor was the doubt resolved in International
Harvester Co. v. Missouri34 where Justice McKenna, the sole dissenter in
the Connolly case, upheld another state anti-trust act which discriminated
between producers and purchasers of commodities. His closing words were
"It is said that the statute as construed by the Supreme Court of the State
comes within our ruling in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., but we do
not think so."3 5  And two years later the same court, after citing the
Connolly case inter alia, stated "We need not pause to review them or the
many cases decided since them explaining the wide discretion a legislature
has in the classification of objects of legislation." 3° There thus remained
unoverruled a decision which maintained its position of record while govern-
ment, through a variety of acts, recognized the farmer as an individual
apart in an industrial society, supported his co-operative ventures, relieved
him from the restrictions of the anti-trust laws, and freed him from taxes.3 7
But lower courts have questioned .its status only four times,38 twice in
federal tribunals which cited it some twenty-five times. Generally district
29. State v. Kinney, 293 N. V. 393, 398 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1940).
30. Olsen v. Nebraska, 61 Sup. Ct. 862 (U. S. 1941).
31. 184 U. S. 540 (1902).
32. Id. at 564.
33. 202 U. S. 446 (1906).
34. 234 U. S. 199 (1914).
35. Id. at 215.
36. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. v. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283, 285 (1916).
37. The legislation is collected in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 145-146 (1940).
38. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 266 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); Karr v. Baldwin,
57 F. (2d) 252 (N. D. Tex. 1932); Northern Wisconsin Co-op Pool v. Bekkedal,
182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924); Ex parte Tigner, 132 S. W. (2d) F85 (Te,
Cr. App. 1939).
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and circuit courts were not confronted with the problem of its appropriate-
ness, so numerous were other applicable, though different, constitutional
decisions available as precedent. Nevertheless, it was still followed as recently
as 1933 when the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declared
unconstitutional a New Hampshire Peddlers and Hawkers Act which ex-
empted vendors of agricultural products and implements.30 It remained for
two state tribunals to "overrule" the decision themselves, 40 which they did
"with due deference to the superior authority of the Supreme Court""
because "it may be doubted whether at the present time the holding in
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co..... would be followed."142 This latter
pair of decisions paved the path for justice Frankfurter to deal the mortal
blow in Tigner v. Texas.43
Also to be disparaged as precedent is a time-worn decision which has
been chipped away by constant distinguishment and contraction. Into the
field of administrative law, the Supreme Court, in 1932, threw the bomb-
shell of Crowell v. Benson 44 wherein Chief Justice Hughes established trials
de novo for "constitutional" and "jurisdictional" facts. These vague terms,
with their conveniently dubious definition, immediately arousing speculation
as to their validity,45 remain technically untouched today. But, in view of
subsequent rulings in this field and the altered personnel of the Court, it
is questionable whether they carry their weight in paper.
Four years subsequent to the Crowell decision, the Court affirmed trial
de novo, for "constitutional" fact,40 but in 1939, a newly constituted bench
enunciated, through Justice Frankfurter in Rochester Telephone Corp. v.
United States,47 criteria for judicial action subsequent to that of any admin-
istrative board. Among them was administrative finality, making it incum-
bent on federal courts to accept the findings of the commissions as conclusive
if the administrators had not ignored the clear preponderance of evidence.
No mention was made of "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts.4 1 The
39. Healy v. Ratta, 67 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933). The Connolly case was
also followed in United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 633 (D. Ind. 1920).
40. Northern Wisconsin Co-op Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 593, 197 X. W.
936, 944 (1924) ; Ex partc Tigner, 132 S. A. (2d) 885, 893 (TeM. Cr. App. 1939).
41. Ex parte Tigner, 132 S. IV. (2d) 885, 893 (Te. Cr. App. 1939).
42. Northern Wisconsin Co-op Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 593, 197 X. W.
936, 944 (1924).
43. 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940).
44. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
45. Dickinson, Crowell v. Bcnson (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. RE-. 1055; Comment
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037; Comment (1932) 46 HALv. L. REv. 478; (1932j 30 Micii.
L. REv. 1312; (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 738; (1932) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. 93.
46. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
47. 307 U. S. 125 (1939).
48. This fact has been deemed important. See Hankin, Recent Trends in ThC
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (1940) 8 GEo. W.su. L. RLE.
1001, 1025.
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same Court, through the same justice, emphatically affirmed this position
on the final opinion day of the 1939 term when it asserted, "It is not for
federal courts to supplant the Commission's judgment even in the face of
convincing proof that a different result would have been better."' 49 During
the same term, South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassctt,50 distinguishable
on its facts from the Crowell case, had reflected'a tendency to limit the effect
of the decision, when the Chief Justice failed to mention the case even
though certiorari had been granted to resolve circuit court conflict in inter-
pretation of the Crowell decision. Thus, Crowell v. Benson, despite the fact
that previous to the Rochester ruling, trials de novo were granted in three
cases, 51 rests in precipitous proximity to oblivion.
Yet no lower court has "overruled" the Crowell case. "Inferior" judges,
occasionally professing uncertainty 5 2 as to the meaning of the terms involved,
have succeeded in confining it to its facts 5 3 so as to alleviate the result of
any straight application, but it has been followed at least seven times.54
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit even extended it to
a consideration of the Johnson Act.55 In but one instance did the Crowell
case's applicability as precedent appear in great doubt and there it was
finally followed by a sharply-divided court.5 6
These three instances provide illustration of the necessity for the exercise
of wider but careful discretion by lower courts in adherence to precedent.
In each case, members of the junior bench had reason to know the inappro-
priateness of these unoverruled but mutilated decisions. These same judges,
if faced with conflicting precedents in a common law field, one antique, one
49. Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, 584
(1940).
50. 309 U. S. 251 (1940).
51. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10 (1935) (review of
jurisdiction of United States Land Office); United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105
(1936) (reView of I. C. C.) and Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. United States, 298 U. S.
349 (1936) (review of I. C. C.).
52. N.L.R.B. v. Cherry Cotton Mills, 98 F. (2d) 444 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938);
Metropolitan Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Lowe, 22 F. Supp. 65 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
53. See, for example, St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322
(W. D. Mo. 1935).
54. Green v. Crowell, 69 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Metropolitan Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Hoague, 72 F. (2d) 175 (App. D. C. 1934); Denver Union Stockyard
Co. v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 735 (D. Colo. 1932); Wichita Gas Co. v. Public
Service Comm., 2 F. Supp. 792 (D. Kan. 1933); Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v.
Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6 (W. D. Va. 1933); United States v. International Freighting
Corp., 20 F. Supp. 357 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Metropolitan Sand & Gravel Corp. v.
Lowe, 22 F. Supp. 65 (E. D. N.'Y. 1938).
55. Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 1st,
1936).
56. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 58 F. (2d) 290, 295 n. (W. D.
Mo. 1932).
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modern, normally follow the later one. In public law,57 however, judges
exhibit timidity, perhaps because, instead of conflicting precedents, the" are
faced with one precedent and an opposing modem trendr s But public la,:
must be expressed in trends lest the pace of social forceso leave the judicial
machinery far behind.59 When a "superior" court is cognizant of this and
moves swiftly, the judicial system's over-all vigor will depend in no small
part on "inferior" courts matching the speed of action by expressing greater
independence of the dead hand of the past.e0
This independence, if it is to have a prophylactic rather than a disruptive
effect, must be prudently employed. Supposition founded on pure conjecture
comports with this problem as inadequately as it does with any other legal
analysis. Decision here must be guided by the fair preponderance of the
evidence, and the evidence admissible consists of considerations of current
social and economic factors, public opinion, recent movements by the appellate
tribunal, and the personal philosophies of the appellate judges now sitting.
The zone of freedom is bounded by knowledge, not hunch.
To comply with the requirement of knowledge, a lower court judge should
today accept as mandatory precedent, for instance, Stc-wart Dry, Goods Co.
v. Lewis-' and Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,"2 standing
for the doctrine that classification for tax purposes according to gross sales
is arbitrary and violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These cases continue to bear weight even though the Court
has recently indicated its readiness to reconsider them in Minnesota v.
National Tea Co.,6 and even though the earlier case received unfavorable
57. Into this field has been adopted the doctrine of stare decisis, a doctrine originally
born to the common law. Its application as a controlling consideration in this field
has been seriously doubted. See, for example, Llewellyn, The Constitution as an
Institution (1934) 34 Co. L. Rxv. 1, 6, 35.
58. Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135 (1936), holding that a property
tax which did not take into account the financial collapse of 1929 was invalid, is in
definite conflict with Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940)
which, on the same point, decided the tax was valid since the needs of the state required
it. While the former decision is not an antique in point of time, it is out-rded in view of
the change in the Court
59. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), which held that Congressional
regulation of child labor is unconstitutional as an invasion of the powers reserved to
the States, ought not to have been controlling even before it -was overruled by the
Supreme Court in approving the Fair Labor Standards Act. United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 61 S. Ct 451, 458 (U. S. 1941) ; see Golding, The Industry Committee Pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1941) 50 YA.E L. J. 1141, 1142.
60. "The trial courts would operate out on the front line, where the impact
. . . is first felt" Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power (1940) 27 VA.
L. RFxv. 1, 23.
61. 294 U. S. 550 (1935).
62. 299 U. S. 32 (1936).
63. 309 U. S. 551 (1940), 29 GEo. L. J. 373.
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comments, 64 most of which approved the Cardozo-Brandeis-Stone dissent.0 5
Were the fact situation of either to reappear in a lower court today there
could be but one conclusion. The evidence of disapproval is not sufficiently
persuasive to sanqtion independence, for the Court has in no way indicated
even a likely result of reconsideration.
While narrowing by the Supreme Court may stifle a precedent, distin-
guishment which provides a more restricted but, nevertheless, continuing
life for a case preserves that case as authority. Thus, the Duplex Printing0
and Bedford Cut Stone 7 decisions, recipients of both commendation and
condemnation from Justice Stone in the Apex Hosiery 8 case have not been
specifically overruled. In the latter case, the Court professing to follow the
earlier holdings that secondary boycotts in restraint of interstate commerce
were in violation of the Sherman Act, actually placed them on a new ground,
inserting beneath them a newly-created economic test concerned with market
price variation. But when this ruling was coupled with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,"0 in United States v. Hutcheson ° the force of the Duplecx and Bedford
cases appears to have seriously deteriorated.
There is extant a belief 7 ' that the dissents of Justice Black in the General
Talking Pictures72 decisions are today law. This belief must be based on
the fact that at the time of its original hearing Justice Black was the only
new appointee on the Court, and on the further fact that two years later
there was decided another patent case 73 in which all five recent appointees
sided with the majority in an opinion similar to Justice Black's dissent. But
lower judges have no duty to act in disregard of the Talking Pictures case.
Justice Black dissented in an infringement suit concerned with use restric-
tions. He concurred with a later majority in deciding an action brought
by the Government under the Sherman Act for price restrictions. In view
of this clear distinction between the cases and despite the pronounced change
in the ranks of the Court, the Talking Pictures case is not one to go ignored
in the lower courts. There exists no expressed conflict of opinion.
The problem for "inferior" judges is thus posed by the antithetical demands
of society for a law that is stable and sure and for a law that is in sufficient
64. See (1935) 35 CoL L. REV. 606; (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1434; (1935)
33 Mici. L. REV. 1278; (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1024.
65. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 566 (1935).
66. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
67. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Assoc., 274 U. S. 37 (1927).
68. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
69. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 104 (1934).
70. 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
71. See HAMILTON, TnE PATTERN OF CO.MPETITION (1940) 73, n. 8.
72. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 183
(1938), reargued and aft'd, 305 U. S. 124, 128 (1938).
73. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
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flux to keep apace with current needs.7 4 "A few hints, a few suggestions,
the rest must be trusted to the feeling of an artist." 75 Tie attitude advocated
can be simply stated: if the underlying reasons for a precedent are gone,76
if the precedent has been ignored and isolated in the dim past while com-
peting philosophies have surged ahead7 7 or if the precedent is adhered to
only for face-saving purposess7 8 -then a lower court should feel free to
wield an axe; but if an old precedent has been simultaneously damned and
praised without a clear description of its force,7 " or if the precedent is recent
and no disparaging words have been forthcoming' - then a lower court
may feel free to pass the task of axe-wielding on to higher authority.81
Progress will appear and conflict be resolved by clearing the vast under-
brush of contradictory cases. This could effectively be accomplished within
the Supreme Court, but that tribunal seldom expressly repudiates the prece-
dents it now considers inappropriate. Frequently it has been satisfied to
evade a decision where direct overruling is avoided s2 and unmindful of the
clarity required when "the sentence of today will make the right and wrong
of tomorrow,"8' 3 has passed on that responsibility to the lower courts. This
responsibility can be accepted and constructively handled by these courts
74. Spruill, The Effect of an Overriding Decision (1940) 18 N. C. L. Rcv. 199,
202.
75. CAsnozo, op. cit. supra note 1, 36.
76. See discussion of Tyson and Ribnik cases su pra p. 1450.
77. See discussion of ComAll, case supra p. 1452.
78. See discussion of Crowell case supra p. 1453.
79. See discussion of Duplex Printing and Bedford Cut Stone cases spra p. 1456.
80. See discussion of General Talking Pictures case mpra p. 1456.
81. "Inferior" judges should be aware that express overruling, as in Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), may leave an old decision with yet one final breath.
In the Hallock case, Justice Frankfurter, overruling Helverhig v. St. Louis Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 39 (1935) and Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935), said at 119,
"We have not before us interests created or maintained in reliance on those cases." It
would appear, therefore, that the St. Louis Trust cases control trusts established between
1935 and 1940. Such a case will probably never arise, however, since the Internal Revenue
Bureau has adopted this view of limiting the retroactivity of the Hallock decision.
9 U. S. L. VEFK 2191 (1940).
The lower courts should also perceive the valid fractions of a "partially-overruled"
decision. Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79 (1911) and Jin Fuey Moy v. United
States, 254 U. S. 189 (1920) were each expressly overruled in part only in Furd: v.
United States, 290 U. S. 371, 387 (1933); yet only in a single case, Heller v. United
States, 104 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939), have the valid portions of either of
them been cited. They must perceive every movement within the Court. See Bemis
Bros. Bag Co. v. Feidelson, 13 F. Supp. 153, 158 (W. D. Tenn. 1934).
82. See Powell, 1939-1940 Supreme Court Decisions on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce (1940) 26 BuLT. NAT. TAx Ass'WN 23, 25.
83. Cmnozo, op. cit. supra note 1, at 21.
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by an extinction of the query "What has the Supreme Court done?" and
substitution therefor of the query "What would the Supreme Court do?"
The answer to the latter question, necessarily pointing beyond the immediate,
would make apparent the futile rigidity inherent in the formality of precedent
and would indicate that "the whole subject-matter of jurisprudence is more
plastic, more malleable, the moulds less definitively cast, the bounds of right
and wrong less pre-ordained and constant than most of us . . . have been
accustomed to believe."1
8 4
For an "inferior" judge to discover and determine disparity between the
Court's past profession and present performance,8 5 presenting the reasons
why, would be to exert the pressure so patently imperative and to fulfill
a duty of active assistance to the court above. 86 The discord of decision,
thus temporarily decreased, could be permanently harmonized upon appeal
by the Court. To the litigants before the "inferior" judge there would be
effected a saving in court expense, inasmuch as an appeal to reach an in-
evitable result would not be necessary. If no appeal were taken, there
would be established good precedent for the jurisdiction outlawing dubious
precedent. To the judge there would come a creative opportunity,81 possible
political protection,8 8 and freedom from the risk of reversal.
84. Id. at 161. But see Gray, Judicial Precedents (1895) 9 HARv. L. REv. 27.
85. As in every legal proceeding, the facts and nature of the case at bar will
determine the action of the judge. In one instance, an "inferior" judge might deem
it proper to follow doubtful precedent while expressing grave uncertainty as to its
appropriateness. In another instance, he might feel it his duty to disregard the precedent,
spelling out his reasons therefor. But in either case the losing party would have
sufficient indication to warrant an appeal and the judge would be exercising that
careful discretion now so necessary.
86. Thus in Brooks v. Dewar, 9 U. S. L. W=ax 4345 (U. S. 1941) the Supreme
Court almost explicitly invited the aid of the lower courts in clarifying a conflict:
"The petitioner asserts that the judgment below should be reversed because the suit
is one against the United States; because the Secretary of the Interior is an indis-
pensable party, and, because the State court was without power to enjoin a federal
officer. He admits that earlier cases in this court are against his contention and relies
on others which he says sustain his view. As this Court remarked nearly sixty years
ago respecting questions of this kind, they fiave rarely been free from difficulty and
it is not 'an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of the court in this class of
cases.' The statement applies with equal force at this day. We are not disposed to
attempt a critique of the authorities. Since the jurisdiction and the procedure of the
court below is sustained by decisions of this Court, we are unwilling to have our judg-
ment upon a resolution of asserted conflict touching issues of so grave consequence where,
as here, the bill fails to make a case upon the merits." Id. at 4346.
87. Under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), "inferior"
federal courts must undergo this same procedure as regards state court decisions and
their availability as precedent. This was done before the Torinpkins ruling in United
States v. Adams Express Co., 119 Fed. 240, 244 (S. D. Iowa 1902) where the court
refused to follow a state decision because "the Iowa Supreme court only decided the
case as it did because of stare decisis . . ."
88. One of the factors in the rejection by the Senate of the nomination of Judge
John J. Parker as associate justice of the Supreme Court in 1930 was his refusal in
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Still available, it is true, are the judicial implements of distinguishment
and omission, conveniences existing as by-products of Anglo-American juris-
prudence and soothing devices for the timid jurist. To use them in dealing
with these problems is artfully to dodge8 9 rather than to perform the task
of the judiciary.
U. Mf. NV. A. v. Red Jacket Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) to
disregard Hitchman Coal-Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917). 72 Co:Nc. Rac.
7793, 7933, 7936, 8037, 8100, 8439 (1930), collected in LANis, LA.o LAw (1934) 141.
89. Most recent obvious example of this use is United States v. One Dodge Sedan,
113 F. (2d) 552 (C. C.A. 3d, 1940).
